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Race and Discretion in American Medicine
M. Gregg Bloche, M.D.,J.n.·t
Rarely has a piece of social science research received more attention
than the 1999 study by Kevin Schulman and others reporting large
differences in physicians' responses to identical heart disease symptoms
presented by black and white actors portraying patients.' The 720
2
physician-subjects who participated in the study referred lower
proportions of Mrican-American than white age and sex matched
"patients" for cardiac catheterization, a costly, state-of-the-art diagnostic
measure, even after the researchers controlled for physicians' subjective
impressions of disease likelihood and severity. Critics quickly found errors
in the authors' statistical methodology-errors that exaggerated these
3
racial disparities. The New England journal of Medicine, in which the article
4
appeared, then took the extraordinary step of issuing a partial retraction.
Yet publication of the Schulman study did more than any other single
event to put the matter of racial disparities in health and medical care on
the American public policy agenda-and to frame political discussion of
the topic. Hundreds of prior publications reported powerful evidence of
racial gaps in life expectancy, morbidity from various illnesses, access to
health insurance and services, and the clinical management of disease. 5
But the Schulman study's use of Mrican-American and white actors with
identical scripts presented a stark picture of pure racial bias,
uncomplicated by the potentially mediating roles of educational
background, economic status, or other social cues. The study received
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national media attention, and months later a congressional appropriations
6
report termed its findings "alarrning." Report language spotlighting the
Schulman study accompanied federal legislation funding an Institute of
Medicine (I OM) inquiry into the scope, impact, and causes of racial bias in
American medicine. A variety of other public and private sector initiatives
targeted racial bias in American health care as a topic for research,
7
discussion, and intervention.
Racial disparities in health care provision that persist even when
researchers control for income, education, and health insurance status are
the primary focus of these initiatives. Efforts to understand the reasons for
these disparities have focused on psychological, social, and cultural
influences that affect providers' clinical judgments and patients' expressed
preferences. In this Article, I explore institutional, economic, and legal
factors that contribute to these disparities. This contribution, which I
contend is larger than commentators on health care disparities typically
acknowledge, occurs through interaction between organizational and legal
arrangements and physicians' exercise of clinical discretion. Because these
arrangements are amenable to pragmatic intervention, they deserve close
attention.
My focus in this Article is on racial disparities in medical care
provision-that is, on differences in the services that clinically similar
patients receive when they present to the health care system. Racial
disparities in health status, which is not greatly influenced (on a
population-wide basis) by medical care, are beyond my scope here.
Disparities in medical care access-potential patients' ability, financial and
otherwise, to gain entry to the health care system in the first place, are also
outside my focus. But I begin this Article by putting the problem of racial
disparities in medical care provision within the larger context of disparities
in health status and medical care access.
In Part I, I concede: (1) that medical care is almost certainly less
important as a determinant of health than are social and environmental
influences, and (2) that inequalities in Americans' ability to gain entry to
the health care system probably play a larger role in medical treatment
disparities than do racial differences in the care provided to people who
succeed in gaining entry. I then briefly examine the moral politics behind
the appearance of racial disparity in health care provision on the national
policy agenda, ahead of disparities in health status and medical care access.
In Part II, I consider the links between clinical discretion and racial
disparities in health care provision. I argue that pervasive uncertainty and
disagreement, about both the efficacy of most medical interventions and
the valuation of favorable and disappointing clinical outcomes, leave
96
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ample room for discretionary judgments that produce racial disparities.
Neither existing institutional and legal tools, nor prevailing ethical norms,
impose tight constraints on this discretion. As a result, provider (and
patient) presuppositions, attitudes, and fears that engender racial
disparities have wide space in which to operate. In Part III, I refine this
argument, pointing to a variety of extant organizational, financial, and
legal arrangements that interact perniciously with psychological and social
factors to potentiate racial disparities. Part IV considers the impact of the
managed care revolution, contending that its cost containment strategies
both contribute to racial differences in health care provision and create
opportunities for reducing some of these disparities. Part V closes with
some recommendations as to how health care institutions and the law
might respond pragmatically to racial disparities even as they pursue other
important policy goals.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICS OF DISPARI1Y IN HEALTH AND MEDICAL
CARE

Notably missing from the national political agenda, though well
documented in the research literature, are the larger problems of
population-wide racial gaps in health status and access to medical care.
Epidemiological research in the United States and abroad indicates that
health care is only modestly important as a determinant of population-wide
health. Variations in medical spending account for only a small portion of
population-wide class and race-related differences in health status: life
expectancy, infant mortality, and the incidence of many diseases correlate
much more closely with income, education, environmental conditions,
8
race, and ethnicity. Racial disparities in health care access arise in large
part from socio-economic disadvantage and the consequently unequal
affordability of medical coverage and services. 9 Disparities in the health
care Americans receive that persist after researchers factor out measures of
socio-economic status are narrower.
Scholars in a diverse range of fields, from health services research to
bioethics to developmental economics, have highlighted disparities in both
health care affordability and health status, debated their causes, and
proposed solutions. But there is no serious prospect of public action to
ameliorate these disparities. Universal health insurance coverage would
greatly reduce racial differences in health care access that result from
disparities in ability to afford coverage, yet universal coverage has been off
the American political agenda since the collapse of the Clinton
administration's reform plan in 1994. The more intractable problem of
racial disparities in health status has attracted some of the research
97
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 97 2001

I (2001)

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
10

attention recently paid to social determinants of health, but our politics
has not focused on these disparities as a problem in urgent need of a
public policy response.
Why has racial bias in the clinical judgments physicians make on
behalf of equivalently insured and socio-economically situated Americans
generated a greater political response than has the racially unequal impact
of allowing more than forty million Americans to go without medical
coverage? 11 And, why have racial disparities in health status-a thing
distinct from health care provision and not much influenced by itreceived less political attention than has racial bias in physician judgment?
The answers to both questions, I suspect, implicate our national tolerance
for socio-economic inequality as a factor in disparities we deem
unacceptable when they result purely and simply from racial bias. As a
matter of law-and of politics-we tend to .treat racial disparities in
Americans' enjoyment of myriad goods, services, and benefits as less
troublesome when they are mediated through socio-economic differences
than when they arise from the overt bigotry of identifiable actors. Thus,
racial disparities in access to health care (and in physicians' clinical
12
recommendations) due to differences in insurance coverage are more
"acceptable" than up-front racial bias at the bedside, despite the known
correlation between coverage status and race (and despite the causal role
of prior racial subordination in present socio-economic disadvantage).
Racial disparities in health status are not readily tied to identified,
racially biased actors. To the extent that these disparities arise from the
disproportionate presence of minorities in lower socio-economic strata,
they are subject to dismissal as epiphenomena of socio-economic
inequality. Even the disparities that persist when indicia of socio-economic
class are factored out cannot easily be linked to particular perpetrators.
Explanations for these lingering health disparities have invoked stress from
13
diminished social connection and repeated experiences of prejudice, as
well as myriad losses of material opportunity that fail to register in assays of
14
socio-economic status. The pervasive, often subtle discrimination these
explanations entail cannot be traced to a small circle of identifiable
perpetrators.
The politics of racial disparity in health matters has important
practical implications. Framing the problem of racial disparity as one of
bias in clinical judgments concerning patients who differ by race but are
similarly situated in terms of insurance status and income draws attention
away from race-related economic disadvantage and from illness-inducing
stress arising from pervasive racial bias. To the extent that focusing on
racial bias in therapeutic decisionmaking makes it politically more difficult
98
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to direct public attention (and resources) toward the larger problem of
race-related economic and social disadvantage (and its health
consequences), there is tension between different approaches to the
relationship between race and health. This tension is two-fold-between
efforts to reduce bias in clinical judgment and to make coverage and care
more affordable and between devotion of resources to medical care and to
programs targeting the social and economic determinants of health status.
I do not mean by this to suggest that racial disparities in care provided
to similarly insured and economically situated patients are other than
deeply troubling and deserving of a robust public policy response. To the
contrary, our national political attentiveness to matters of racial justice is
intermittent and partial at best, and I believe we should seize opportunities
15
when they arise. And it may even be that, rather than pulling attention
away from other forms of race-related disadvantage, public focus on racial
disparities in clinical decisionmaking could inspire national concern about
other kinds of health disadvantage that disproportionately affect some
racial groups.
In any event, racial disparity in medical decisionmaking has emerged
on the public policy stage as both a health policy and a civil rights issue.
More than many other civil rights problems, it has attracted bipartisan
concern. We should endeavor to translate this visibility and concern into a
pragmatic strategy for addressing racial bias in health care provision. In so
doing, we should also keep our eye out for larger lessons, about how
racially biased outcomes can result, even absent overt bigotry, from the
decentralized exercise of discretion within the complex, fragmented
institutional arrangements characteristic of much of contemporary
American life.
To these ends, I will try, in the remainder of this essay, to identify ways
by which the organization and legal governance of health care provision
may foster racial disparities in clinical decisionmaking-and how legal
change therefore might make a positive difference. I will also consider
law's limits in this regard, as both an explanation for these disparities and a
tool for ameliorating them. I am mindful that racial bias, in medical care as
in other endeavors, is not solely, even primarily, a function of institutibnal
or legal arrangements, and that not all health care disparities arise from
providers' racial prejudices. Institutions and law nonetheless make a large
difference, and modest change in the health care industry's legal
environment might substantially reduce disparities in care provision.

II.

CLINICAL DISCRETION AND RACIAL DISPARI1Y

My starting point for considering the role of institutions and the law is
99
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the enormous discretion clinical caretakers routinely exercise and the
similarly wide discretion of those who decide whether insurers will payutilization reviewers and, increasingly, treating physicians who act as
gatekeepers. Most medical decisions do not rest firmly on empirical
evidence. There are typically multiple diagnostic and therapeutic options,
and wide variations in the incidence of many common medical and
surgical procedures have been documented within small geographic areas
16
and between individual practitioners. Absence of professional consensus
about appropriate diagnostic and therapeutic measures often reflects the
lack of undergirding scientific evidence. The paucity of scientific support
for most medical decisions both contributes to clinical practice variations
and makes it impossible in many cases to reach evidence-based conclusions
as to which practice variations constitute over and underuse. Lack of
agreement on how to value favorable (and unfavorable) clinical outcomes
even when possible outcomes are empirically predictable amplifies medical
17
practice variations. These variations create room for clinical discretion
constrained more by different local and institutional traditions than by
science-based medical practice parameters.
A. Legal and Administrative Constraints on Clinical Discretion

Neither private health insurance contracts nor the statutes governing
publicly financed coverage (principally Medicare and Medicaid) contain
language that meaningfully limits this discretion. Contractual and statutory
provisions typically mandate coverage for all "medically necessary" care,
subject only to categorical exclusions such as "investigational" therapy and
care received "out-of-network" or not in accordance with required referral
procedures. What constitutes "medical necessity" in particular cases is up
to individual caretakers and utilization reviewers. The problem of general
standards and the broad discretion they confer is, of course, familiar to
lawyers. Courts and regulatory agencies manage the indeterminacy and
inconsistency that come with this discretion in three principal ways. The
classic method is the issuance of successive, published, more or less
reasoned decisions in particular cases. This enables parties (and legal
decisionmakers) in subsequent disputes to narrow the scope of discretion
and limit the resulting indeterminacy and risk of inconsistency through
efforts to reason by analogy from prior decisions. An alternative approach,
more .commonly followed by regulatory agencies, is the issuance of detailed
decision rules all at once, in a comprehensive attempt to interpret general
(typically statutory) standards. A third approach, taken tacitly by legal
decisionmakers, is to cloak the exercise of discretion instead of trying to
18
constrain it. Reliance on juries (which deliberate in secret and neither
100
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give reasons nor set precedents) and on grievance and arbitration
procedures that decide cases confidentially without creating precedent is
illustrative. This approach does nothing about the problem of
indeterminacy but keeps inconsistencies decorously veiled.
The first and second approaches are simply not feasible in the health
care sphere. Nothing resembling the formal process of successive
published opinions occurs when physicians make the scores of clinical
19
judgments they render every day. To try to replicate such formality at the
bedside would freeze the fluid process of diagnosis and therapy. To be
sure, new information technology is making it increasingly possible to
record major clinical decisions and their outcomes anonymously yet
accessibly. But tracking down and comparing case histories in order to
assess the relevance of prior outcomes for a present clinical situation will
remain a complex, costly endeavor, subject to the infinite variability of
clinical scenarios and to our ignorance about which comparable patient
features are relevant to the clinical question at hand. Such comparisons,
20
moreover, typically constitute cognitive error, perhaps the most common
cognitive error in traditional therapeutic reasoning. It is the aggregation of
outcomes data from many prior patients similarly situated with respect to
some clinical features that renders comparison with a current patient
rational in statistical terms, so long as the current patient meets inclusion
21
criteria for the group of prior patients.
The second approach, promulgation of detailed decision rules for all
or most possible contingencies, has the potential, in theory, to substantially
limit clinical discretion. Health plans that base their utilization
management decisions on sets of clinical practice protocols written by plan
managers or acquired from consulting firms 22 have tried this approach to
some degree, and the difficulties they have encountered point to its
limitations. Empirical uncertainty about the outcomes of most medical
interventions undermines the perceived legitimacy of health plans'
practice (and payment) protocols. Absent scientific support, such
protocols are easy to challenge when they become the basis for denial of
services. Competing understandings of "appropriate" care leave courts,
review panels, and other decisionmakers without evidentiary grounds for
23
choice. Even a much-intensified national program of clinical outcomes
research would leave this problem largely in place. Would-be authors of
comprehensive payment protocols confront a classic "bounded
24
rationality" problem: the awe-inspiring complexity and variability of
human physiology renders anticipation, clear definition, and empirical
study of most clinical contingencies impossible. The scope of practitioners'
discretion is further widened by the subjectivity and inevitable
101
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incompleteness of clinical observation and interpretation. Myriad clinical
signs and symptoms are open to varying perceptions and characterizations.
Clinical laboratory findings, in conjunction with symptoms and signs, are
often susceptible to multiple interpretations. Clinical narratives are
selective-and no less centered around a point of view than is an attorney's
statement of facts on a client's behalf. 25 Even if we could craft a
comprehensive set of evidence-based rules for clinical decisionmaking, this
subjectivity and incompleteness would make application of the rules a
matter of considerable discretion for both the treating physician and the
utilization manager.
The third approach, which looks to cloak discretion rather than
constrain it, is more closely akin to what actually happens in health care
settings. Most of the time, physicians exercise their broad discretion
invisibly, making no record apart from clinical progress notes and
submissions to utilization reviewers. Only when clinical judgments become
the subject of medical conferences, insurance coverage disputes, or legal
or regulatory proceedings, do these judgments emerge from the veils of
patient confidentiality and professional collegiality. Physicians' practice
styles may become known to some degree within their home institutions,
but their decisions do not create governing precedent, and their
inconsistencies go mostly unnoticed. Utilization management in individual
cases is no more transparent. Health plans' coverage decisions are
commonly influenced by medical practice and payment protocols, but
these protocols are often proprietary. Individual coverage decisions are not
reported publicly and do not set precedents that limit discretion in
subsequent cases. Inconsistencies between a health plan's utilization
management decisions are likely to go unseen except in the rare cases
when litigation ensues.
B. Ethical Responses to Clinical Discretion

The pervasive role of clinical discretion in medical practice has long
been recognized by medical ethicists. The classic medical ethics answer to
the problem of discretion has been the Hippocratic Oath's
26
uncompromising commitment to the well-being of each patient. To be
sure, as I have observed elsewhere, physicians commonly serve social
purposes that are at odds with this commitment's literal meaning. Medical
cost containment, public health, and clinical evaluation for legal purposes
are among the functions that create tension between this commitment and
27
society's expectations.
Yet in their everyday clinical work, the
overwhelming majority of physicians see undivided loyalty to individual
28
patients as an ethical lodestar. Beyond this commitment, and the
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concomitant duty to maintain professional competence, the Hippocratic
ethical tradition prescribes no rules for the exercise of clinical discretion.
Classic medical ethics, rooted in the Hippocratic tradition, is akin to virtue
ethics, reliant on the goodness of the doctor as a moral agent, rather than
rule-based moral reasoning. 29 It parallels the law's reliance on fiduciary
obligation in numerous situations marked by a principal's inability to
monitor the performance of her agent. 30 These approaches entail a
common strategy-encouragement of right conduct through interventions
designed to insulate agents (including physicians) from bad intentions,
especially those engendered by conflicts of interest. They share, therefore,
the premise that discretionary judgments arising from right intentions do
not, as a rule, warrant additional oversight or constraint.
For the past thirty years or more, the bioethics movement has
challenged this benign view of well-intentioned discretion in the medical
sphere. Committed to the new paradigm of patient autonomy and
concerned about professional paternalism, bioethics commentators have
insisted that physician discretion be tempered by the obligation to seek
patients' informed consent. The paradigm of patient autonomy relies
upon physician disclosure of risks, benefits, and clinical alternatives to give
patients meaningful veto power over their doctors' discretion. But as
31
skeptics about this veto power have observed, physicians have wide
latitude to frame clinical alternatives and to shape the contours of
disclosure about them. Large variations in clinical practice, within the
realm of professional acceptability, translate into vast discretion in the
presentation of therapeutic options. Informed consent law's formal
equality-its requirement that all material options, and their risks and
benefits, be disclosed-is thus subverted by the heterogeneity of medical
practice. This occurs openly in jurisdictions that defer to professional
standards of materiality in defining disclosure duties and tacitly in
jurisdictions that mandate disclosures material to the "reasonable
32
patient." Thus the scope of patients' veto power over their doctors'
exercises of clinical discretion is in large measure the product of this
discretion. Moreover, patients fearful and dependent in moments of dire
medical need are not inclined to assert the veto power they have. To go
against the doctor's advice is to go out on one's own, something we are
least willing to do when we feel most vulnerable.

C. Race and the Exercise of Clinical Discretion
The substantive content of clinical discretion is thus largely beyond the
reach of the ethical paradigms that nominally govern it. Physician
discretion remains a wild card in American medicine, ill-constrained by
103
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contractual obligation, legal requirements, or ethical norms. And, absent
the exercise of this discretion in identical fashion for members of different
racial groups, racial disparities in clinical decisionmaking are inevitable.
What accounts for racial and other group differences in the exercise of
clinical discretion? Comprehensive assessment of the evidence bearing on
this question is far beyond this Article's scope, and a sure answer is well
beyond our reach. But partial, provisional answers are possible, and they
point the way toward pragmatic interventions that hold out significant
potential for the reduction of racial disparities.
To begin with, the weakness of existing constraints on clinical
discretion opens the way for beliefs and attitudes that operate beyond the
reach of overt institutional and legal rules. Physicians' expectations and
suspicions concerning therapeutic compliance and the presence of such
co-morbid factors as substance abuse, poor living conditions, and lack of
family and social support figure prominently in clinical judgments
concerning patients' ability to adhere to risky and costly courses of
33
treatment.
Suppositions about patients' truthfulness, self-discipline,
laziness or industry, level of suffering, tolerance for pain, and intelligence
influence both diagnostic impressions and treatment recommendations.
To the extent that race-related preconceptions affect these
expectations and suppositions, racial disparities in clinical judgment ensue.
A large, multidisciplinary literature documents and models the
formulation and operation of such preconceptions. Cognitive psychologists
have analyzed racial stereotypes and prejudice in functional terms, as
automatic (or unconscious) category-based responses that conserve the
mind's cognitive resources at the price of reduced responsiveness to
human individuality. 34 Although stereotypes and prejudice can rise to the
level of conscious bigotry, they more often operate unconsciously, as
automatic cognitive placement of persons into categories with fixed sets of
characteristics or as conscious placement of persons into categories with
unconsciously surmised characteristics. Psychodynamic and sociocultural
models of stereotyping and prejudice likewise recognize the import of
unconscious preconceptions. 35 Below the waterline of conscious
categorization and presupposition, stereotypes and prejudice have free
reign, shielded from human self-awareness. Medical judgment informed by
such stereotypes is bound to yield racially disparate results, even absent
conscious intent.
Beyond this, the attenuation of empathy across racial lines in clinical
relationships can engender unconscious devaluation of minority patients'
hopes, fears, and life prospects, with invidious consequences for clinical
judgment, in the absence of conscious bigotry. Cultural and language
104
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barriers between patients and providers can both amplifY this effect and
impede communication about symptoms, treatment options, and patient
preferences. 36 To the extent that the time pressures, sleeplessness, and
subservience to authority inherent in medical training imbue an
37
inclination toward automatic, unreflective reactions to clinical situations,
these features of medical training enlarge the role of stereotypes,
prejudice, and barriers to empathy in clinical practice.
Patients' attitudes, beliefs, and capabilities also affect clinical judgment
and action in ways that are beyond the control of overt institutional and
legal rules. Patients' trust and doubts about medical advice, tolerance for
pain and discomfort, attitudes about long-term/short-term trade offs, and
levels of social and emotional support influence physicians'
recommendations and patients' willingness to accede to them. To the
extent that these features correlate with race, they are additional sources of
clinical disparity. Some commentators have collapsed these aspects of
38
patients' experiences into a single category of patient "preferences,"
drawing a dichotomy between such "preferences" and racial discrimination
as competing explanations for health care disparities. This reductionistic
account overlooks the interactive links between patients' "preferences" and
their experiences of discrimination. For many Mrican Americans, doubts
about the trustworthiness of physicians and health care institutions spring
39
from collective memory of the Tuskegee experiments and other abuses of
40
black patients by largely white health professionals. This legacy of distrust,
which, some argue, contributes to disparities in health care provision by
discouraging Mrican Americans from seeking or consenting to state-of-theart medical services, is thus itself a byproduct of past racism. In more
intimate ways, minority patients' negative experiences with care providers
can diminish their preferences for robust treatment and thereby engender
racial disparities. Physicians' suspicions, stereotypes, negative expectations,
and reduced empathy across racial lines can affect patients' feelings about
their clinical relationships and thereby dampen patients' interest in
vigorous diagnostic and therapeutic measures. Efforts to distinguish
patient "preferences" from provider racial discrimination neglect the ways
by which patients' negative responses to the latter can profoundly affect
the former.
Beyond this dampening effect on minority patients' medical
"preferences," health care providers' stereotypes, prejudices, and
diminished empathy across racial lines can make it more difficult for
minority patients to negotiate clinical bureaucracy. Maneuvering through
the catch-22's, cul-de-sacs, and nests of discretion within hospitals and
managed care bureaucracies is essential to the accessing of clinical
105
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resources. Clinical caretakers are critical actors in this maneuvering. To
the extent that their advocacy efforts are adversely influenced by racerelated impressions and lesser personal engagement, racial minority status
translates into disadvantage in negotiating medical bureaucracy, and thus
into disparate real-world access to clinical services despite formal equality.
In addition, to the extent that the discretionary judgments of gatekeeping
bureaucrats-e.g. HMO pre-authorization reviewers and hospital staff who
prioritize patients on waiting lists for tests and treatments in short supplyare influenced by racial insensitivities and stereotypes, these gatekeepers
make a separate contribution to health care disparities. The subjective
sense of disempowerment often associated with racial minority status41 can
further widen the disparities that ensue from clinical administration.
People who feel less able to assert their needs tend either to do so with less
vigor or, more invidiously, to feel bitter, even resentful, and to act in a
manner that conveys this bitterness, thus rendering clinical administrators
less empathic.
III. INSTITUTIONS, INCENTIVES, AND THE LAW

If beliefs and attitudes beyond the controlling authority of institutional
and legal governance play such a large part in the racially disparate
exercise of clinical discretion, what role, if any, do health care institutions
and law have in engendering health care disparities? I submit that this role
is large, and that organizational design, economic incentives, and the legal
and regulatory environment interact perniciously, in unexamined ways,
with the psychological factors I have discussed to potentiate disparities in
clinical judgment. My starting point for making this claim is the
unpalatable truth that setting limits on the care we provide is a crucial task
for clinical institutions and heal_th law. Writing for a unanimous Supreme
Court last year in Pegram v. Herdrich, Justice David Souter put this point
bluntly with regard to managed care, declaring that "whatever the HMO,
there must be rationing and inducement to ration" and that "rationing
necessarily raises some risks while reducing others .... "42 The need for
limit-setting is no less for other health plans that must operate within a
budget, whether fiscal constraints are imposed by competitive pressures in
the health insurance marketplace or voters' limited tolerance for the tax
burden of publicly funded medical coverage.
A. Fee-for-Service Payment and Demand-Supply Mismatches

When physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and managed care
1s not a factor, demand-side limit-setting plays a minimal role. Clinical
106
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caretakers committed to the Hippocratic ethic of undivided loyalty to
individual patients and aware of their insured patients' low out-of-pocket
costs are motivated to demand (on behalf of their patients) virtually all
services with potential benefits that outweigh clinical risks. To be sure, the
psychological factors I have discussed, including unconscious stereotyping,
prejudice, and reduced empathy across racial lines, may influence the
weighing of clinical benefits and risks, generating demand-side racial
disparities. But under fee-for-service physician compensation, supply-side
constraints on care probably play a larger role in engendering racial
disparities. Supply-side constraints arise from limited physician time (due
to barriers to entry maintained by the medical profession) / 3 restrictions on
44
hospitals' ability to raise capital for new facilities and equipment,
regulatory and market-driven constraints on hospital payment rates, and
regulatory programs (especially "Certificate of Need" requirements) that
45
limit hospital investment in new facilities, services, and equipment. These
supply-side constraints, alongside generous insurance coverage, create a
46
myriad of demand-supply mismatches within hospitals and other clinical
institutions.
These demand-supply mismatches have great potential to generate
racial disparities in care because of the interplay between the mechanisms
that mediate these mismatches and the nature of race-related disadvantage
within clinical institutions. As the economist Jeffrey Harris has observed,
excess demand for a hospital's services creates multiple internal queues for
47
services. Absent bright-line, easy-to-apply criteria for prioritizing among
patients in a queue, the politics of personal influence and professional
hierarchy shapes resource allocation. Attending physicians with the
professional stature and/ or political skills to push their patients to the
head of the queue in clinically ambiguous situations will do so on behalf of
those to whom they feel most committed. Conversely, housestaff and less
influential attending physicians will have more difficulty moving their
patients up the queue. Moreover, treatment of patients in hospital clinics
and other settings characterized by rapid staff turnover and lack of
continuity of care renders committed physician advocacy on behalf of
these patients less likely, whatever the professional standing and influence
of their attending doctors. Patients cared for by high-status physicians in
settings that support continuity of clinical relationships thus have
preferred access to services when demand-supply mismatch conditions
exist.
To the extent that people of color are more likely to see low-status
48
providers, who are less able (or inclined) to maneuver effectively within
clinical bureaucracies on their patients' behalf, racial disparities in care are
107
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likely to ensue from these status disparities. More research into which
patients tend to access the most (and least) elite physicians-and into
whether these differences give rise to disparities in clinical services
received-is much needed. But it has long been recognized that
hierarchies of professional stature and commitment to patients within
49
clinical institutions parallel hierarchies of patient socio-economic class.
Well-off and influential patients tend to link up with elite academic and
private physicians, to sustain their relationships with these physicians, and
to benefit from these physicians' sponsorship and advocacy in hospital and
other institutional settings. 50 Middle-class patients tend to access a lower
level of sponsorship and advocacy, from private physicians without elite
51
status and influence. Working poor and unemployed patients, especially
the uninsured, tend to find their way to a bottom tier of public clinics
staffed by rotating house officers and salaried attendings with little
institutional cache.
Social networks, family contacts, and levels of assertiveness can be as
important as financial wherewithal in distributing patients across these
echelons of professional status, sponsorship, and advocacy. Little is known
about the links between these factors and race, and about the extent to
which race (and its social consequences)-divorced from economic
status-pushes patients up or down across these echelons. But evidence
suggests that members of disadvantaged racial minority groups are more
confined than whites (of similar economic status) in their range of social
contacts and less inclined to challenge professional authority. 52 If this is the
case, it would hardly be surprising were it to be shown that Mrican
Americans and other people of color find their way into the health care
system at lower strata of professional sponsorship and advocacy than can
be accounted for by economic class alone. And to the extent that lower
levels of sponsorship and advocacy mean lesser access to services in short
supply, racial disparities in care are to be expected. More speculatively,
feedback from the supply side to the demand side may aggravate these
disparities. Aware of . chronic demand-supply mismatches, physicians,
especially those at lower status levels, might modulate their clinical orders
53
to bring demand more into line with supply constraints.
B. Medical Tort Law and Clinical Discretion

The law of health care provision has been largely hands-off, in
practice, concerning the links between clinical discretion and racial
disparities. Medical malpractice law, in theory, prescribes a unitary level of
54
care, regardless of health insurance status or ability to pay. But tort
doctrine has long deferred to physician standards of care, under the sway
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of the lingering fiction that there is a single "correct" standard, discernable
from physician-experts through the adversary process. Disparities in
clinical resource use ensuing from physician discretion and the influences
I have just discussed tend to fall within the bounds of tacitly accepted
clinical variation. Lower intensity care provided to a minority patient can
thus typically be defended as consistent with one or another widely
accepted standard of care. A tort plaintiff can attack care provided
pursuant to a particular standard by pointing to an alternative standard
and relying upon expert testimony to argue that this alternative should
have been followed. But so long as the defense can marshal its own expert
to support the adequacy of the care provided, the plaintiff's need to carry
the burden of proof presents a daunting obstacle to success. Medical
malpractice cases commonly turn clinical practice variations into battles of
the experts, unresolvable on rigorous empirical grounds, over which
standard constitutes "reasonable care." Absent the high-quality data about
efficacy of alternative approaches that would be needed to resolve clinical
practice variations in the first place, proof of causation-in-fact presents
another large barrier to plaintiffs. Technologically less intensive
approaches often cannot be shown to yield inferior clinical outcomes.
Moreover, even when there is strong empirical support for the superior
efficacy of one approach compared to another, the medical tort system
sends a weak behavioral signal. Only a small proportion of arguable errors
of clinical judgment-arguable based on empirical grounds for preferring
55
one approach to another-result in medical malpractice suits. Even
smaller proportions yield monetary settlements or judgments, and poor
people and members of disadvantaged minority groups are less likely than
other Americans to sue their doctors. 56
C. Medicaid and Programmatic Fragmentation

Other sources of law bearing on the behavior of doctors and clinical
institutions have been similarly hands-off with regard to racial disparities.
The Medicaid program's meager payment rates for doctors and hospitals
have consigned this program's poor, disproportionately minority
beneficiaries to largely separate, often segregated systems of hospital and
neighborhood clinics, 57 with their own norms of medical practice,
inevitably shaped by their tight resource constraints. The reluctance of
private physicians to accept Medicaid rates as payment in full has not only
kept Medicaid patients out of private doctors' offices; it has consigned
them to "ward" or "community service" status as inpatients, cared for
58
primarily by housestaff as opposed to private attendings. Congressional
repeal of the Boren Amendment, which required Medicaid payments to
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doctors and hospitals to be "reasonable and adequate" and gave health
care providers a federal cause of action against state Medicaid programs/;()
has entrenched Medicaid's low payment scales and largely separate systems
of care. More research is needed on the question of how, if at all, standards
of care within these separate systems differ from mainstream medical
practice-and on whether racial disparities occur within the Medicaid
program. But given the pervasiveness of clinical practice variations in
American medicine and the pressure on practitioners in any system to
adapt their clinical judgments and conduct to the system's resource
constraints, it would be surprising if practice within Medicaid-oriented
systems were not less technology-intensive than mainstream care. And,
given the segregation of Medicaid-oriented systems from each other, by
neighborhood and community and therefore, in practice, by race, it would
be surprising if racial disparities within the Medicaid program did not
ensue. 61 As I will discuss later, 62 the recent shift in federal policy toward the
easy granting of statutory waivers to permit start-up of Medicaid managed
care programs is creating new possibilities for clinical fragmentation and
disparity.

D.EMTALA
Judicial interpretation of the federal Emergency Medical Treatment
63
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) has drained its force as a deterrent to
disparate treatment in the emergency room. The Act requires hospitals
that operate emergency rooms and participate in Medicare or Medicaid to
screen all emergency room patrons for "emergency medical conditions"
regardless of their ability to pay, to provide stabilizing treatment for such
conditions, and to refrain from discharging patients or transferring them
64
to other facilities on economic grounds. Federal appellate panels in
several circuits have held that EMTALA's mandatory emergency screening
examination need not meet national standards of care, but need only
65
measure up to the screening hospital's regular practice. The practical
consequences for plaintiffs66 are enormous. Deprived of the opportunity to
search nationally for experts to testify about the appropriate standard of
care, they must look to physicians familiar with emergency room screening
practice at the hospital they intend to sue-or to other evidence of this
hospital's emergency room procedures. The resulting "code of silence"
problem is obvious: avoidance of the "code of silence" barrier was a
principal reason for the shift from community to national standards of care
in medical malpractice law. The cursory evaluation and transfer or
discharge of members of disadvantaged minority groups-whether for
financial reasons, racial ammus, or unconscious prejudice-is thereby
110
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rendered more likely to occur with impunity. State laws mandating
emergency room screening and stabilizing treatment-a topic beyond my
scope in this Article-have generally been construed and applied with
67
similar permissiveness.
E. The Unfulfilled Potential of Title VI

In theory, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has enormous
potential as a tool for reduction of racial disparities in health care
provision. Title VI bars discrimination based on race by all who receive
"federal financial assistance" and extends beyond intentional
discrimination to reach many facially neutral practices with disparate racial
impact. Title VI has achieved some of its potential, most notably through
enforcement action by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) and DHHS's predecessor agency68 against hospitals'
employment of such discriminatory practices as denial of admitting
69
privileges to African-American physicians, refusal of admission to patients
lacking attending physicians with staff privileges, high prepayment
requirements for black patients, and discriminatory routing of
70
ambulances. In these cases, the DHHS Office of Civil Rights has
compelled such measures as revision of requirements for staff privileges,
elimination of prepayment requirements, and changes in ambulance
routes. 71 Title VI's coverage of entities that receive "federal financial
assistance" encompasses all hospitals that receive Medicare or Medicaid
payments, making its potential reach remarkably broad.
Yet more might have been achieved, had more been attempted. The
federal regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI did not offer detailed
compliance instructions to health care institutions72 and, more
significantly, held that Medicare's payments to physicians do not constitute
73
"federal financial assistance." The later, fateful decision put private
physicians out of Title VI's reach, even though virtually all other federal
payments to private actors are treated by the regulations as "federal
74
financial assistance," triggering Title VI protections. Treating physicians'
income from Medicare as "federal financial assistance" would have given
DHHS a powerful civil rights enforcement tool, applicable not only to
racial disparities in the care provided to Medicare patients, but also to
disparate treatment of non-Medicare patients by physicians who accept
Medicare. Since most physicians in private practice accept Medicare, 75 and
since physicians remain the key decisionmakers with respect to use of
hospital resources and services, extending Title VI's reach to Medicare
coverage of physician services would subject most of the private health care
sector to Title VI enforcement.
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Detailed reviews of Title VI's application to medical care have been
76
performed by others. I will limit myself here to the observation that the
principal, still unfulfilled promise of Title VI in the health sphere lies in
translation of what is now known about racial disparities in health care
provision into practices and policies that reduce these disparities,
especially when they can be shown to contribute to differences in health
status. More specific regulatory guidance (grounded in findings from
empirical research), more robust DHHS monitoring and enforcement,
and application of Title VI to private physicians would represent important
steps in this direction. Title VI's reach beyond intentional discrimination
to policies with disparate racial impact enables civil rights enforcement to
make use of institution-specific statistical evidence of disparities in health
care provision. Such evidence may suffice to state a prima facie case of
discrimination, requiring a health care provider to justify policies and
practices that result in racially disparate clinical decisions." Proof of
institution-specific disparities-and of causal links between such disparities
and particular policies and practices-will pose daunting challenges.
Litigation involving statistical evidence of clinical disparities is likely to be
78
expert-intensive and hence costly. But the ongoing revolution in
electronic clinical record keeping is making such evidence increasingly
accessible to civil rights enforcement authorities.
The promise of such evidence would be much greater were private
parties permitted to seek legal relief, under Title VI, from policies with
79
disparate racial impact. But in April 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VI did not create a private right of
action concerning policies with disparate impact, absent discriminatory
intent. Title VI's future as a health policy tool will thus be shaped largely
by the federal executive branch, through its civil rights enforcement
policies.
F Clinical Role Conflict and Patient Distrust
Beyond all this, the law of health care provision has taken a stance of
not-so-benign neglect toward features of American medicine that invite
distrust among disadvantaged minorities. Law, in action, tolerated
Tuskegee, or at least failed to prevent it. 80 The law today tolerates physician
participation in an array of activities that are at odds with the Hippocratic
commitment of undivided loyalty to patients81 and that especially effect
disadvantaged groups. The prison doctor, whose therapeutic role is often
confused by conflicting duties to keep order82 and determine criminal
responsibility, is hardly a benign figure in the lives of inmates, and African
Americans are disproportionately represented in U.S. prisons. The
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physician who both attends to the medical needs of Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) detainees and prescribes drugs to sedate
83
those who resist deportation is a similarly problematic figure in the eyes
of many Latinos and others who have had personal or family experience
with INS detention. Academic physicians overly focused on the training
and research purposes of patient encounters, and psychiatrists at state
mental hospitals who prescribe high neuroleptic doses to maintain order,
are other examples to which the most disadvantaged Americans are
disproportionately exposed. The likely result of the law's sometimes overt
and other times tacit acceptance of such role conflict is further erosion of
trust-and of willingness to go along with robust, state-of-the-art clinical
interventions when well-meaning physicians make them available.

IV.

THE MANAGED

CARE REVOLUTION

Managed care has introduced new institutional dynamics that both
contribute to racial disparity in health care provision and create openings
for progress toward eliminating some disparities. Prospective utilization
management by administrators remote from the bedside, use of financial
incentives to influence physician judgment, and the proliferation of
differently designed coverage options have large implications for clinical
discretion and thus for inter-group disparities. The law has responded
sluggishly to these market-driven developments, which are occurring too
84
quickly for courts and regulators to keep pace.
A. Prospective Utilization Management

Utilization management by remote case reviewers has created new
possibilities for disparity in health care provision. To the extent that
prospective utilization review applies detailed coverage rules in a
standardized fashion (whether or not the rules are well grounded in
scientific evidence of clinical efficacy), it has the potential to make clinical
care more uniform. But the subjectivity and ambiguity of clinical situations
make such standardization elusive, and the complexity and individuality of
human pathophysiology render rules for all contingencies impossible. 85
The result is that success in competition for resources within a health plan
depends in large part on committed, effective advocacy by clinical
caretakers-an asset that, for reasons discussed earlier,86 members of
disadvantaged minority groups are less likely than others to have. The
outcomes of competition for resources within a plan also turn on
utilization managers' discretion. There has been almost no research into
subjective influences on utilization reviewers' decisions in ambiguous cases.
113
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But it seems likely that empathy with particular patients (as portrayed
clinically by their caretakers) and the colder calculus of who is most likely
87
to appeal (and ultimately to sue) each play roles. Both of these factors
favor the affluent, the educated, and the most advantaged racial and
ethnic groups. Research is much needed into how members of
disadvantaged minority groups fare in comparison with others at accessing
services and resources within particular health plans.
B. ERISA Immunity for Utilization Management

Health plans' immunity from medical malpractice suits for their
88
utilization management decisions has empowered preauthorization
reviewers to exercise their discretion unconstrained by law in many states.
A series of federal appellate court rulings in the 1990s construed the
Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to preempt general
state tort and contract law bearing upon administration of benefits by
89
employer-provided health plans. These decisions, moreover, interpreted
ERISA to bar federal actions for consequential damages, closing the door
90
to meaningful tort liability. But over the past several years, a number of
states have enacted laws imposing a variety of safeguards and remedies,
including independent medical review of disputed claims denials, and a
split between the circuits emerged in 2000 concerning whether these
91
statutes circumvent ERISA preemption. As this Article goes to press, the
future of health plan accountability for denial of benefits is uncertain.
Congressional compromise this year on so-called "Patients' Bill of Rights"
legislation could redefine now-entrenched battle lines, or the Supreme
Court could intervene to clarify this confusing area.

C. Physician Financial Incentives as a Management Tool
A decade ago, proponents of managed care envisioned a world of
competing, vertically integrated health plans, able to control costs through
bulk purchasing power and administrative authority over clinical
92
decisions. But by the end of the 1990s, a very different medical
marketplace had emerged, characterized by what one close observer calls
"virtual integration"-rapidly shifting contractual alliances between health
plans (which eschewed vertical integration as insufficiently adaptable to
changing conditions) and hospitals and physician groups. 93 A striking
feature of this new managed care marketplace is its wholesale shift from
the paradigm of cost control via centralized management of clinical
decisionmaking to an alternative model-devolution of financial risk, and
94
thus responsibility for cost control, to practicing physicians. Economic
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rewards for frugality and penalties for pricey tests, treatments, and referrals
95
have become lodestars for contemporary clinical practice. The result has
been greatly increased reliance on the discretion of gatekeeping clinical
caretakers to set limits and manage scarcity. This means more room for
free play of the cognitive, affective, and social and cultural factors
discussed earlier, which influence clinical discretion in racially disparate
ways. It also makes medical resource allocation more of a function of
physicians' suspicions and fears about who will protest, if denied a test or
treatment, and who might sue. By dispensing with the bureaucratic
inefficiencies and irritants of remote utilization review, the managed care
industry is forgoing this latter method's limited prospects for
standardization in favor of an approach that risks abdicating the pursuit of
clinical consistency.
Financial incentives in themselves are not pernicious; moreover, they
are inevitable. But the simple, open-ended incentives to withhold care that
many managed health plans now employ sacrifice opportunities for
supporting quality and rewarding equity within budgetary constraints. One
can imagine more nuanced incentive schemes that reward measurable
efficacy and engagement with patients as well as financial savings. Payment
96
tied to appropriate health promotion and disease screening practice,
patient satisfaction, and measurable treatment successes, 97 as well as to
frugality, has the potential to reduce racial disparities in care by pushing
physicians toward colorblind benchmark practices. In this regard, last
year's U.S. Supreme Court holding, in Pegram v. Herdrich, 98 was dismaying
for its categorical rejection of efforts to read regulatory constraints on
physician incentives into ERISA's ambiguous language. 99 But it is possible
that consumer unhappiness over financial rewards to physicians for
withholding care could push health plans toward these more nuanced
incentive programs through market means.
D. Fragmentation and Health Care Disparities

We have not yet achieved the health care system some erstwhile market
00
advocates urge/ characterized by multiple tiers of medical coverage
offering overtly different, contractually defined standards of care. Such a
regime might be more honest in its acknowledgment of clinical disparity
than the system we now have. Health insurance contracts continue to
promise "medically necessary" care, without overt reference to
economizing or to cost-benefit tradeoffs. Yet multiple coverage options
offering different benefits packages, degrees of choice of provider, levels of
access to elite physicians and hospitals, and levels of preauthorization
review and financial incentives to physicians to practice frugally segment
115
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today's medical marketplace-by personal wealth and health status as well
as consumer and employer preference. Managed care plans comprised
largely or entirely of Medicaid recipients and other poor Americans have
expanded coverage for the neediest but further segmented the market. We
have only sketchy empirical knowledge about the differing levels of
intensity of care provided by low-end versus high-end health plans, and it
has not been shown that low-end coverage, by itself, produces inferior
medical outcomes. 101 But it is reasonable to surmise that, all else being
equal, less generous coverage predicts lower intensity of care, since care
must be provided within a budget. And it is reasonable to surmise,
therefore, that population groups disproportionately represented in lowerend plans receive, on average, a lower intensity of care. Studies of racial
disparity in health care provision have attempted to control for insurance
status broadly categorized (e.g. Medicare, Medicaid, or private coverage),
but they have not broken medical coverage down into categories along this
segmented spectrum. They thus leave open the possibility that proven
racial disparities in care result, to some degree, from the disproportionate
presence of disadvantaged groups in lower-end plans.
Little is known about the distribution of disadvantaged minority
groups across this country's fragmented medical marketplace, beyond the
fact that they are disproportionately represented in Medicaid-only plans.
But we do know that fragmentation of health care financing and provision
engenders the development of disparate clinical practice norms, arising
from distinct institutional cultures and provider and patient characteristics,
as well as from different levels of fiscal constraint. The extreme example of
South Mrican medicine under apartheid illustrates the point. The
architects of apartheid built an almost bizarrely fragmented health system
by intentional design, creating multiple, parallel institutions, with different
per capita resource constraints, for different, officially recognized racial
102
groups.
Within these parallel institutions, sharply different clinical
practice and resource allocation norms emerged. Individual clinicians,
working, for the most part, in only one or a few settings, could adhere to
the norms "appropriate" to their employment settings without having to
confront, in day-in, day-out fashion, the very different norms applicable in
others. Fragmentation in American health care does not come close to this
disturbing extreme, and structural features of the U.S. health care
marketplace protect against a large movement in this direction. The
phenomenon of "virtual integration," for example, entails participation by
03
most providers-doctors and hospitals-in multiple health plans/ and
human cognitive limits and the complexity of medical practice make it
unlikely that individual clinicians will be able to learn and adhere to
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multiple, dramatically different standards of care for differently insured
104
patients. Still, the South Mrican caricature is a useful warning about the
risks involved, from a racial and social justice perspective, in a system of
health care coverage choice that devolves too far toward market and
administrative fragmentation.
V. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

Institutional design and legal governance cannot, by themselves, meet
the moral challenge posed by racial disparities in American health care
provision. Efforts to intervene at the psychological and social levels, in the
course of medical education, apprenticeship, and ongoing professional
life, are essential if the stereotypes and prejudgments that engender
racially disparate clinical judgments are to be effectively addressed. Patient
education and reassurance efforts that take great care to avoid even the
appearance of "blaming the victim" are also vital. Yet institutions and law
make a large difference. They can potentiate, or attenuate, the operation
of the psychological processes that produce disparity. I will conclude with
some brief suggestions about how our health care institutions and law
might respond pragmatically to the problem of racial disparity even as they
pursue other important policy goals.
A. Rule-Based Cost Control

To the extent possible, given the gaps in our knowledge about medical
care's efficacy and the impossibility of anticipating all clinical
contingencies, medical limit-setting should be based on rules. The classic
advantages of rules over general, discretionary standards-consistency,
predictability, and at least the appearance of disinterested objectivitymake detailed rules preferable from the point of view of reducing racial
disparities in medical care. Pragmatic balances must be sought between
these advantages of rules and their rigidities, and in this regard there may
be tensions between the goal of reducing racial disparities and the virtues
of greater clinical flexibility. Requirements by private accrediting entities
and state regulatory bodies that health plans' clinical practice protocols be
published, with supporting evidence and argument, and thus open to
professional and consumer review would aid in the deliberative balancing
of the virtues of rules and discretion. Clinical rules that are not backed by
evidence and argument should not be entitled to deference in
administrative or legal proceedings that involve challenges to health plans'
application of such rules. But where rules do have empirical support, even
if the evidence IS at best debatable, administrative and legal
117
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decisionmakers should give substantial weight to the social importance, in
a racially and culturally diverse nation, of making agonizing allocative
choices in a manner that achieves some consistency in appearance and
practice.
B. The Architecture of Physician Financial Incentives

Pursuit of cost control the crude way, by simply paying physicians more
to do less, makes gatekeeping clinical caretakers' stereotypes and selective
empathy into medical resource allocation policy at the macro level. By
raising the social stakes attached to clinical discretion, it amplifies the
social impact of these stereotypes and failures of empathy. To the extent
that health plans abdicate the management of care by abandoning efforts
to craft and implement reasonable, evidence-based clinical practice
protocols, these stereotypes and failures of empathy can play out,
unfiltered, as plan policy. Economic incentives, either to provide more or
fewer services, are unavoidable, and blanket condemnations of all
incentives are naive. But some limits on incentives to withhold treatment
are desirable to control the pressure on physicians to abandon their
105
fiduciary commitments to patients and allow their worst reactions to
racial difference to come to the fore. 106 The U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Pegram v. Herdrich foreclosed federal restrictions on physician incentives
under ERISA, but it left room for state limits on rewards to physicians for
107
w1"thh o ld"mg care.
More finely crafted physician incentives can have a positive role in
efforts to reduce racial disparities in care. Greater economic rewards for
time spent engaging patients and their families can contribute to
overcoming barriers of culture, communication, and empathy, and the
cost of these incentives can be covered by reducing the large premium
paid to physicians for time spent performing procedures. Insurance
coverage for the modest cost of language translation services can yield
large improvements in communication (and physician empathy) for some
patients. Payment schemes that reward measures of patient satisfaction and
confidence would further encourage the bridging of barriers related to
racial difference. Incentives to adhere to evidence-based protocols for
frugal practice and to engage in age and gender appropriate disease
screening would encourage efficient, quality care generally and penalize
race-related deviations. Payment linked to favorable clinical outcomes,
where reasonably measurable-e.g. control of diabetes, asthma, and high
· blood pressure-would provide additional encouragement. Industry
movement toward more nuanced incentive schemes along these lines
could be catalyzed by private accrediting bodies, encouraged by business
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and professional leaders, and even initiated by public payers.

C. Strengthening Doctor-Patient Relationships
The connection between a patient's access to clinical resources within
a hospital or health plan and her doctor's stature, skill, and commitment
as an advocate underscores the importance of strengthening minority
patients' bonds with physicians positioned (and willing) to play the
advocate's role vigorously. It may not be realistic to insist on an end to the
wealthiest, most influential patients' superior ability to gain access to the
clinical judgment and institutional clout of the most elite physicians. Yet
we can aspire to the goal of ensuring that every patient, whether insured
privately or publicly, through Medicare or Medicaid, has a sustained
relationship with an attending physician, not merely a house officer, who is
able to navigate the health care bureaucracy effectively on the patient's
behalf. Federal and state performance standards for Medicaid managed
care plans should include minimum requirements for the stability of
patients' assignments to primary care providers 108 (and these providers'
109
accessibility), reasonable maximum patient loads per primary physician,
and minimum time allotments for patient visits. Regulations governing
health plans' participation in Medicare should include similar standards,
as should private accrediting bodies' prerequisites for all health plans.
More controversially, patients from historically disadvantaged groups
might be given the option to select primary care providers from similar
backgrounds, since ample evidence shows that such concordance is
associated with greater patient satisfaction and more consistent provision
110
of preventative care. On the other hand, the explicit color-consciousness
this would entail risks entrenching the racial biases to which this remedy
responds. At a minimum, evidence of the clinical benefits of racial
concordance weighs in favor of robust commitment to affirmative action in
medical school admissions, residency recruitment, and professional hiring.
D. ''De-Fragmentation" of Health Care Financing and Delivery

The disproportionate presence of members of disadvantaged racial
minorities in lower-end health plans may be a major source of racial
disparities in health care provision, since efforts to control for insurance
status in studies of clinical disparity have not taken detailed account of
variations among health plans. 111 Research into the distribution of racial
minorities across the fragmented American health care marketplace, the
differences in intensity of care between lower and higher end health plans,
and the relationship (if any) between these differences in intensity and the
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quality of clinical outcomes should be a national priority. In the
meanwhile, it is reasonable to surmise that efforts to reduce the socioeconomic segmentation of the medical marketplace would probably
diminish racial disparities in service provision. Fragmentation engenders
different clinical cultures, with different practice norms, tied to varying per
capita resource constraints.
Concrete regulatory steps can limit such fragmentation. Movement
toward managed care as a tool for both containing the Medicaid program's
costs and extending its coverage reach can be accompanied by a
requirement that participating health plans enroll some minimum number
(expressed in percentage terms) of private subscribers. Plans that
participate in Medicaid (or other public programs for the poor and nearpoor) can be required to contract with hospitals and physician networks
that serve minimum percentages of patients who purchase coverage
without public subsidies. At times, regulatory restraint may be in order.
State legislators should resist doctors' efforts to win regulatory protection
from health insurers' insistence that providers accept patients from all
plans an insurer offers. Health insurers' bargaining power on this issue is a
force against fragmentation. Were physicians able to pick from among the
varied coverage "products" each firm offers-by limiting the numbers of
patients they accept from low-end plans or by simply refusing to participate
in these plans-they would self-segregate toward different medical
marketplace segments, making segment-by-segment differences between
practice styles more pronounced.
The question of how much fragmentation is too much is ultimately
political, tied to the larger debate over the relative importance of equity,
liberty, and reward for enterprise in American life. As such, this question is
beyond my scope here. But the economic segregation of Medicaid patients
into a bottom-end system of Medicaid-only HMOs, decrepit public
hospitals, and separate public clinics strains the lower boundaries of
decency. Medicaid's statutory promise, in 1965, of mainstream care for the
poorest Americans can only be kept through national and state
commitments to supply the resources needed for these Americans to buy
into the medical mainstream. And for America's more than forty million
uninsured, to whom no such promise has yet been made, the indecency is
patent.
CONCLUSION

The approaches to institutional design and legal governance that I
have urged cannot, by themselves, eliminate racial disparities in health
care provision. Myriad presuppositions, stereotypes, and other
120
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psychological barriers to empathy and understanding influence clinical
judgment in ways that are beyond the reach of organizational and legal
arrangements. Yet institutions do matter. Cost-control that is rule-based
when empirically feasible; financial rewards for patient satisfaction, health
promotion, and favorable outcomes; and efforts to encourage stable
doctor-patient relationships and resist market segmentation along racecorrelated lines promise to channel clinical discretion in ways that reduce
racial disparity. Health plans and regulators can accomplish much along
these lines while pursuing other policy goals, including efficiency and
quality.
The case for institutional and legal steps toward reduction of racial
disparities in clinical care is morally compelling. On the other hand, the
targeting of disparities in health care decisionmaking without a
corresponding effort to reduce racial differences in health status and
access to medical services raises painful questions about health policy
priorities. Should we take pragmatic advantage of the political "moment"
by waging a vigorous campaign against disparities in medical
decisionmaking while tolerating, for a time, differences in health status
and medical care access? Are racial disparities in medical care provision
important apart from their impact on health status, or should their import
be assessed in instrumental terms, based purely on their health impact?
And in a society that accepts, as a philosophical matter, many forms of
inequality that arise from market outcomes, what are the moral
prerequisites for public intervention to ameliorate health-related racial
disparities that spring from economic inequality?
These questions merit deep reflection and robust public debate. But a
larger implication of the overwhelming evidence of racial disparity in
health care provision is clear. This evidence constitutes indisputable proof
that the national task of racial healing is not nearly finished-that tacit,
often unconscious stereotyping, prejudice, and selective empathy persists,
indeed pervades our social life and damages many Americans physically as
well as spiritually. In the health sphere, as in other areas of our national
life, the most pernicious "racial profiling" is that which we do
unreflectively, even unconsciously, as a matter of routine.

121
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 121 2001

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

I (2001)

References

1. Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effect
of
Race
and
Sex
on
Physicians'
Recommendations far Cardiac Catheterization,
340 NEWENG.j. MED. 618 (1999).
2. These physicians, who were not
told that the purpose of the study was to
assess the influence of race (and sex) on
clinical decisionmaking, were shown
scripted,
videotaped
inteJViews
of
hypothetical patients; given additional
clinical information about their "patients;"
then asked to make follow-up clinical
recommendations. /d.
3. Lisa
M.
Schwartz
et
al.,
Misunderstandings About the Effects of Race
and Sex on Physicians' Referrals far Cardiac
Catheterization, 341 NEW ENG. j. MED. 279
(1999).
4. The editors concluded, in a reply to
letters critical of the Schulman paper's
conclusions, that "the evidence of racism
and sexism in this study was overstated" by
the paper's statistical presentation of the
study's findings. Gregory D. Curfman &
Jerome P. Kassirer, Race, Sex and Physicians'
Referrals far Cardiac Catheterization (the editars
reply), 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 287 (1991).
The Journal's editors, it should be noted,
did not deny the existence of racial
disparities in American health care.
5. John Z. Ayanian, Race, Class, and the
Quality of Medical Care, 271 JAMA 1207
(1994); Durado D. Brooks et al., Medical
Apartheid, 266 JAMA 2746 (1991); Robert
M. Mayberry et al., Racial and Ethnic
Differences in Access to Medical Care, 57 MED.
CARE REs. & REv. 108 (Supp. 2000);
Gregory Pappas et al., The Increasing
Disparity in Mortality Between Socioeconomic
Groups in the United States, I 960 and 1986,

329 NEWENG.j. MED. 103 (1993).
6. HOUSE COMM. ON LABOR, HEALTH &
HUMAN SERV., & EDUC. APPROPRIATIONS,
196TH CONG., REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R.
3064, at 1 (2000).
7. AM. MED. Ass'N, AMA TEAMS UP
WITH U.S. SURGEON GENERAL SATCHER TO
ELIMINATE DISPARITIES OF CARE AND IMPROVE
COUNTRY'S HEALTH (2000); AM. PUB.
HEALTH AsS'N, INFLUENTIAL AND DIVERSE
LEADERS JOIN STEERING COMMITTEE OF
APHA/HHS CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE
RACIAL AND ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES
(2000); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., TRANs-NIH COLlABORATION WITH
NIOSH INITIATES STUDIES OF RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH, available at
http:/ /raceandhealth.hhs.gov/sidebars/sb
whats30.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2001).
8. Robert J. Blendon et al., Access to
Medical Care far Black and R'hite Americans,
261 JAMA 278 (1989); Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, Black-R'hite Disparities in
Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344 (1990)
[hereinafter
Black-R'hite
Disparities];
Council on Scientific Affairs, Hispanic
Health in the United States, 265 JAMA 248
(1991); Arline T. Geronimus, Excess
Mortality Among Blacks and R'hites in the
United States, 335 NEW ENG. j. MED 1552
( 1996); Pappas et al., supra note 5, at 103.
9. Marsha Lillie-Blanton & Thomas
Laveist,
Race/Ethnicity,
the
Social
Environment, and Health, 43 Soc. SCI. MED.
83 (1996)
10. See, e.g., Leigh Hopper, Rice, Baylar,
ifF-Houston join to Study Social Causes of
Sickness, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 8, 1999, at A1;
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Persist
between Majority and Minority Americans, Says
0

122
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 122 2001

RACE AND DISCRETION

Patient Care(R) Magazine, PR NEWSWIRE, May
15, 2000, Financial News.
11. There is a strong relationship
between race/ethnicity and the lack of
health insurance in adults. Thirty-one
percent of low-income (less than 200% of
the Federal Poverty Level), white nonHispanics are uninsured, accounting for
50% of the low-income uninsured and 31%
of the entire uninsured population. Black
non-Hispanics are uninsured at a rate of
34%, account for 16% of the low-income
uninsured, and comprise 50% of the
uninsured population as a whole. Fiftythree percent of low-income Hispanics lack
health insurance. Low-income Hispanics
account for 29% of the low-income
uninsured and 19% of the uninsured
population. John Holahan & Niall
Brennan, lWw Are the Uninsured? (URBAN
INSTITUTE, NEW FEDERALISM: NATIONAL
SURVEY OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES, No.14)
(2000), at http:/ /newfederalism.urban.
org/html/ series_b/b14/b14.html
(last
visited Apr. 24, 2001).
12. Some
market-oriented
commentators argue openly for judicial
recognition of multiple tiers of health care
quality, tied to insurance contract terms
mandating different cost-benefit trade-offs
and levels of access to technology-and
thus linked to consumers' ability to pay.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE?
(1997); CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH
CARE CHOICES OF HEALTH REFORM ( 1995).
Such an approach to medical tort law and
the interpretation of insurance contracts
would legitimize racial disparities in
physician judgment that arise from

differences in medical coverage.
13. There
is
ample
evidence,
epidemiological · and
biological,
of
connections between psychosocial stress
and a variety of illnesses, including cancer
and cardiovascular disease. See generally
Johan Denollet, Personality as Independent
Predictor of Long-term Mortality in Patients with
Coronary Heart Disease, 34 7 LANCET 41 7
(1996); Dorthe Hansen et al., Serious Life
Events and Congenital Malformations: A
National Study with Complete Follow-up, 356
LANCET 875 (2000); David Spiegel,
Psychosocial Intervention in Cancer, 85 J.
NAT'L.
CANCER INST.
1198
(1993).
Neuroendocrine pathways that suppress
immune function, increase blood pressure,
and influence metabolism of cholesterol
and other potentially harmful substances
are thought to be responsible. See generally
EJ.
Burker et al.,
Serum
Lipids,
Neuroendocrine, and Cardiovascular Responses
to Stress in Men and Women with Mild
Hypertension, 19 BEHAV. MED. 155 (1994);
M. Fredrikson & J.A. Blumenthal, Serum
Lipids, Neuroendocrine and Cardiovascular
Responses to Stress in Healthy Type A Men, 34
BIOL. PSYCHOL. 45 (1992).
14. E.g.,
Arline
T.
Geronimus,
Black/White Differences in the Relationship of
Maternal Age to Birthweight: A PopulationBased Test of the Weathering Hypothesis, 42
Soc. SCI. MED. 589 (1996); Arline T.
Geronimus, The Weathering Hypothesis and
the Health of African-American Women and
Infants: Evidence and Speculations, 2
ETHNICI1Y & DISEASE 207 (1992).
15. It is hardly obvious that efforts to
assert, in political debate, the competing
importance of social and economic

123
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 123 2001

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

determinants of health and health care
access would result in reallocation of
available resources from activities targeting
racial disparities in clinical judgment to
programs targeting social and economic
inequality. Such an advocacy strategy might
backfire, resulting in diminished efforts
against
racial
bias
in
medical
decisionmaking without a corresponding
increase in efforts to ameliorate socioeconomic inequities and their health
effects.
16. John E. Wennberg, Understanding
Geographical Variations in Health Care
Delivery, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 52 ( 1999).
17. M. Gregg Bloche, Medical Care and
the
Enigma
of Efficiency
(2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), availabk at http:/ /papers.ssrn.
com/paper.taf?abstract_id=184275
(last
visited Apr. 24, 2001).
18. See GUIDO CAlABRESI & PHILIP
BOBBIIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 57 (1978)
(characterizing
this
approach
as
decisionmaking by "aresponsible" agencies
and noting its effectiveness at concealing
compromises between values we hold
dear).
19. To be sure, medical malpractice
lawyers often advise physicians to write
progress notes giving reasons for clinical
decisions so as to facilitate defense against
potential tort claims. But these notes, in
confidential patient records, do not create
a public register of successive, related
decisions.
20. ALVAl'l R. FEINSTEIN, CLINICAL
jUDGMENT 328-49 (1967).
21. The probabilities derived from
such an aggregation of prior outcomes

I (2001)

make possible predictive judgments about
a current patient (so long as he or she
meets the inclusion criteria) despite our
ignorance about which features from prior
cases are relevant to the clinical issue at
hand.
22. Milliman & Robertson Inc., a
Seattle-based consulting firm, developed a
set of guidelines that were adopted by
major health plans. Allen R. Myerson,
Helping Health Insurers Say No, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1995, at Dl.
23. Contractual designation of the
practice protocols to be used for payment
determinations (and even incorporation of
such protocols into insurance contracts)
can resolve, in a formalistic manner, the
question of which protocols apply, but it
cannot resolve skepticism about the
scientific legitimacy of the contractually
mandated protocol.
24. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODEl.S OF
BOUNDED RATIONALI1Y (1982).
25. Indeed, medical students and
residents are taught to present cases, in
work rounds and conferences, in a manner
that conveys the presenter's hierarchy of
diagnostic suspicions and makes the case
for the diagnostic and therapeutic
interventions the presenter proceeds to
recommend. See generally jEFF GusKY,
MEDICAL
STUDENT'S WARD
SURVIVAL
MAl'IUAL 71-85 (lst ed. 1982).
26. The Oath states, in relevant part:
"In every house where I come I will enter
only for the good of my patients."
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 799 (26th
ed. 1995).
27. M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Lcyalties
and the Social Purposes of Medicine, 281 JAMA

124
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 124 2001

RACE AND DISCRETION

268 (1999).
28. Daniel Sulmasy et al., Physicians'
Ethical Beliefs about Cost-Control Arrangements,
160 ARCHIVES INTE&'IAL MED. 649, 651-52
(2000).
29. Another parallel is to the feminist
ethic of care, which also eschews ruleoriented rationalism in favor of good
motives (though it construes goodness
somewhat differently, in terms of empathy
and compassion). See Marilyn Friedman,
The Social Self and the Partiality Debates, in
FEMINIST ETHICS 161 (C. Carded., 1991).
30. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J.
Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1053-1056 (1991).
31. See generally Jay Katz, Informed
Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U.
PITT. L. REv. 137 (1977) (arguing that the
law of informed consent does little to open
the way for meaningful patient autonomy).
32. Even in "reasonable patient"
jurisdictions, see, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502
P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972), treating physicians'
practice styles determine the clinical
options that patients are told about in fact.
In the rare case when a patient brings suit
on informed consent grounds, other
physicians accessed by the patient-turnedplaintiff typically are the source of
information about clinical options (and
risks and benefits) not originally disclosed.
Thus disclosure, in action, is largely a
function of the physicians and clinical
practice styles a patient encounters. For
computer literate (and generally well-off)
patients, the internet is emerging as an
alternative,
state-of-the-art source of
information about clinical options. See

generally SCI. PANEL ON INTERACTIVE
COMMUNICATION & HEALTH, WIRED FOR
HEALTH AND WELL-BEING: THE EMERGENCE
OF INTERACTIVE HEALTH COMMUNICATION
(Thomas R. Eng & David H. Gustafson
eds., 1999). This new source of medical
information inequality further strains the
formal equality expressed in informed
consent doctrine.
33. Black-White Disparities, supra note 8.
34. See generally Susan T. Fiske,
Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in
2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
357, 377 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1998).
35. Within
the
psychodynamic
paradigm,
racial
and
other group
stereotypes satisfY a person's needs for selfesteem and redirect his negative feelings
about
himself
onto
others.
The
sociocultural
paradigm
treats
these
stereotypes as social learning passed to
people within a culture (and useful for
rationalizing differential treatment of social
groups). John F. Dovidio, Stereotyping, in
THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COGNITIVE
SCIENCES 804 (Robert A. Wilson & Frank C.
Keil eds., 1999).
36. Cindy Brach & Irene Fraser, Can
Cultural Competency Reduce Racial and Ethnic
Health Disparities? A Review and Conceptual
Model, 57 MED. CARE REs. & REv. 181-217
(2000); see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, 1 THE HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE:
ACKNOWLEDGING
THE
DISPARITY,
CONFRONTING
DISCRIMINATION,
AND
ENSURING EQUALITY 193 (1999); Lisa
Cooper-Patrick et al., Race, Gender, and
Partnership
in
the
Patient-Physician
Relationship, 282JAMA 583 (1999).

125
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 125 2001

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

37. A substantial literature addresses,
criticizes, defends, and attempts to explain
the punishing time pressures, sleeplessness,
and other stresses of clinical training. See
gmerally John M. Colford, Jr. & Stephen J.
McPhee, The Ravelled Sleeve of Care:
Managing the Stresses of Residency Training,
261JAMA 889-93 (1989);Jenny Firth, Levels
and Sources of Stress in Medical Students, 292
BRIT. MED. J. 1177-80 (1986); Mitchel L.
Zoler, Residency Reform Spreads as Programs
Combat Stress, 29 MED. WORLD NEWS 49-50
(1988).
38. John Z. Ayanian et al., The Effect of
Patients' Preferences on Racial Differences in
Access to Renal Transplantation, 341 NEW
ENG.j. MED. 1661-69 (1999).
39. For several decades after the advent
of curative antibiotic therapy for syphilis,
African-American patients with this illness
were left untreated by researchers who
wanted to observe the devastating, longterm neurological and other effects of
syphilis. Allan Brandt, Racism and Research:
The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, in TUSKEGEE
TRUTH'S:
RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE
SYPHILIS STUDY (Susan M. Reverby ed.,
2000).
40. Patricia A. King, Race, Justice, and
Research, in BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING
JUSTICE IN RESEARCH 88 (Jeffrey P. Kahn et
al. eds., 1998).
Randall,
Slavery,
41. Vemellia R.
Segregation and Racism: Trusting the Health
Care System Ain't Always Easy! An African
American Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. LOUIS
U. Pus. L. REv. 191 (1996) (arguing that
deep-rooted African-American fear and
distrust of the health care system prevents
many African Americans from seeking

I (2001)

treatment).
42. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,
221 (2000).
43. James F. Blumstein, Health Care
Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care:
Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation
Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 146566 (1994).
44. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for
E-xempting Nonprofit Organizations from
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE LJ. 54,
72-75 (1981).
45. Paul L. Joskow, Certificate-ofNeed
Regulation, zn CONTROLLING HOSPITAL
COSTS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
REGUlATION 76 (1981).
46. /d.
47. Jeffrey E. Harris, Pricing Rules for
Hospitals, 10 BELL]. ECON. 224-43 (1979)
(discussing internal organization and
allocation within hospitals).
48. Such clinicians might include
interns and residents, junior attending
physicians, and more senior physicians with
credentials
and
less
prestigious
appointments.
49. RAYMOND S. DUFF & AUGUST B.
HOLLINGSHEAD, SICRNESS AND SOCIETY
(1968).
50. /d. at 234.
51. /d.
52. Helen R. Burstin et al., Do the Poor
Sue More? A Case-Control Study of Malpractice
Claims and Socioeconomic Status, 270 JAMA
1697 (1993).
53. Cognitive dissonance might well
render this change in clinical ordering
behavior unconscious, making it impossible
to assay this effect by surveying physicians
potentially involved.

126
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 126 2001

RACE AND DISCRETION

54. This feature of medical tort law has
been sharply criticized in recent years by
market-oriented scholars who would prefer
to see the courts recognize multiple tiers of
clinical
obligation,
derived
from
contractual arrangements between health
care payers, providers, and patients. See,
e.g., MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL
SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 21315 (1997); E. Haavi Morreim, Playing
Doctor: Cmporate Medical Practice and Medical
Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 939
(1999).
55. PAUL C. WEILER, A MEASURE OF
MALPRACTICE 69-70 (1993) (summarizing
Harvard/New
York
State
medical
malpractice study data).
56. Burstin et al., supra note 52.
57. E.g., Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid
Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty, and
Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 191
(1995).
58. Patients without private doctors
who hold hospital staff privileges face a
Catch-22 when they need hospital
admission: since their outpatient clinic
doctors cannot care for them as inpatients,
they must either find private physicians
with hospital privileges (difficult due to
Medicaid's low payment rates) or be
admitted as "ward" or "service" patients,
cared for primarily by resident physicians.
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a) (13) (C)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987), repealed by
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-33, § 4712(c), 111 Stat. 509 (1997). A
State plan for medical assistance must
"provide ... for
payment. .. of
hospital
services, nursing facility services, and

services in an intermediate care facility for
the mentally retarded provided under the
plan through the use of rates (determined
in accordance with methods and standards
developed by the State ... ) which the State
funds, and makes assurances satisfactory to
the
[Health and Human Services]
Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to
meet the costs which must be incurred by
efficiently and economically operated
facilities in order to provide care and
services in conformity with applicable State
and Federal Jaws, regulations, and quality
and safety standards and to assure that
individuals eligible for medical assistance
have reasonable access ... to inpatient
hospital services of adequate quality."
60. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496
U.S. 498 (1990) (holding that the Boren
Amendment created substantive federal
right enforceable by health care providers).
61. The causal connections between
administrative
fragmentation,
racial
segregation, and inequality in social
programs
have
been
explored
by
commentators in other policy contexts,
especially housing. See, e.g., Philip D.
Tegeler, Housing Segregation and Local
Discretion, 3J.L. & POL'Y209, 234-35 (1994).
See also COMM. ON IMPROVING THE FUTURE OF
U.S. CITIES THROUGH IMPROVED METRO.
AREA GOVERNANCE,
NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, GOVERNANCE AND OPPORTUNITY IN
METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Alan Altshuler et
al. eds., 1999). The connection, by design,
between
unusual
bureaucratic
fragmentation and shocking inequalities in
health care provision was dramatically
evident in the South Mrican health care
system under apartheid. AM. Ass'N FOR THE

127
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 127 2001

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

I (2001)

discharged or transferred without an
adequate emergency screening evaluation
or stabilizing treatment. See EMTALA, supra
note 63, at §1395dd(d) (2) (A).
67. RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW
AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 6061 (1997).
68. The
Department
of Health,
Education, and Welfare.
69. Some hospitals pursued the facially
neutral strategy of refusing to grant
privileges to physicians who were not
members of their local medical societies.
The catch, for African-American doctors
(and their patients) in some localities, was
that these medical societies (which
received no "federal financial assistance"
and were thus beyond Title VI's reach)
refused admission to blacks. DAVID B.
SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE A.t'\'D
HEALINGANATION 16-21 (1999).
70. E.g., id. at 200-25.
71. Sara Rosenbaum et al., U.S. Civil
Rights Policy and Access to Health Care by
Minority Americans: Implications for a
Changing Health Care System, 57 MED. CARE
REs. & REv. 236, 247 (Supp. I 2000).
72. /d. at 238; see also, U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 36, at 77 (asserting
deficiencies in Title VI regulations).
73. The 1988 Amendment of 29 U .S.C.
§ 794, Nondiscrimination under Federal
Grants and Programs, added subsection b,
which defined "program or activity" as "the
operations of. .. an entire corporation,
partnership, or other private organization,
or an entire sole proprietorship-(i) if
assistance is extended to such corporation,
partnership, private organization, or sole
proprietorship as a whole or (ii) which is

ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. & PHYSICIANS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS & HEALTH:
THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID (Audrey. R.
Chapman & Leonard. S. Rubenstein eds.,
[hereinafter THE LEGACY OF
1998)
APARTHEID).
62. Supra text accompanying notes 100104.
63. EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(1995).
64. EMTALA, which requires all of this
regardless of emergency room patients'
ability or willingness to pay, has been
sharply (and, I think, reasonably) criticized
as yet another unfunded federal mandate,
and thus a hidden government levy on
those who cross-subsidize the mandate's
cost. See, e.g., David Hyman, Patient Dumping
and EMTALA: Past Imperfect/Future Shock, 8
HEALTH MATRIX 29, 53 (1998).
65. See, e.g., Summers v. Baptist Med.
Ctr. Arkadelphia, 69 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir.
1995) ("EMTALA is not a federal
malpractice statute and it does not set a
national emergency health care standard;
claims of misdiagnosis or inadequate
treatment are left to [state law]");
Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d
1253 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
EMTALA creates no national standard of
emergency care); Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of
Am., 977 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that EMTALA does not create a national
medical malpractice standard and that
EMTALA liability for emergency medical
screening comes only if the facility fails to
comply with its own procedures).
66. EMTALA confers a private cause of
action
against
hospitals
(but
not
physicians) upon patients who are

128
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 128 2001

RACE AND DISCRETION

principally engaged in the business of
health care." 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A).
74. Rosenbaum eta!., supra note 71, at
239.
75. Over thirty-nine million Americans
are enrolled in Medicare today. See
Statistics on Medicare Enrollment Trends
of the Health Care and Financing
Administration:
1966-1999,
at
http:/ /www.hcfa.gov / stats/ enrltrnd.htm#t
I (last visited Apr. 24, 2001).
76. U.S. COMM'N ON CML RIGHTS, supra
note 36; Rosenbaum eta!., supra note 71.
77. Mark Barnes & Elizabeth Weiner,
Evidence of Race-Based Discrimination Triggers
New Legal and Ethical Scrutiny, 8 BNA
HEALTH L. RPTR. 1984 (1999) (suggesting
that statistical evidence of racial disparity in
the treatment of patients may serve as the
basis for charges of race and/or ethnicitybased discrimination).
78. Id.
79. Alexander v. Sandoval, 69 U.S.L.W.
4250 (2001).
80. See King, supra note 40.
81. See Bloche, supra note 27.
82. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 243-45 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(challenging a
prison
policy
that
authorized treatment of a mentally ill state
prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against
his will without judicial hearing).
83. William Booth, U.S. Accused of
Sedating Departees; Tranquilizers Given to
Those l'W!o Resist, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1993,
at AI.
84. M. Gregg Bloche, A Step Ahead of the
Law, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE
REFORM
(M.
Gregg.
Bloche
ed.,
forthcoming).

85. Supra text accompanying notes 2225.
86. Supra text accompanying notes 4851.
87. Discovery in the pending HMO
class action litigation could shed some light
on whether these factors play a role, as
·plaintiffs' attorneys obtain health plans'
internal memoranda, e-mail, and other
communications concerning utilization
management policy.
88. See generally, Peter D. Jacobson &
Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and
Managed Care Torts, 35 Hous. L. REv. 985
(1998) (arguing that the formalistic ERISA
preemption analysis applied by courts
allowed managed care organizations to
escape liability for their negligence when
providing health care and health care
financing).
89. E.g.,
Corcoran
v.
United
HealthCare, 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that ERISA preempted Louisiana
tort action for wrongful death of unborn
child).
90. Under ERISA, these decisions held
that a plaintiff alleging improper denial of
benefits could recover only the dollar value
of the treatment denied-e.g. the $300
dollar cost of a CT scan inappropriately
withheld, and not for other resulting
damages-e.g. wrongful death if the CT
scan would have revealed the plaintiffs
fatal (but treatable) illness.
91. Compare Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v.
Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.
2000) (concluding that ERISA preempts
the provisions of a Texas statute that
establishes a system of appellate review of
HMO benefits decisions), with Moran v.

129
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 129 2001

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

Rush Prudential HMO, 230 F.3d 959 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that ERISA does not
preempt an Illinois statute that requires
HMOs to submit claim denials for review by
an independent physician).
92. Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick,
A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a
System Designed to Promote Quality and
Economy, 320 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 29
(1989).
93. jAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: COMPETITION AND
INNOVATION IN HEALTH CARE 63-89 (1999).
Forces driving this market trend included
consumers' desire for more choice from
among providers and plan designs than
vertically integrated health plans could
offer and industry executives' anticipation
of
possible
regulatory
and
legal
developments that would subject vertically
integrated plans to heightened liability risk
and public oversight. Bloche, supra note 27.
94. /d.
95. Thomas Rice, Physician Payment
Policies: Impacts and Implications, 18 ANN.
REv. PUB. HEALTH 549 (1997).
96. Examples include rewards to
pediatricians for retention of patients in
well child care, and rewards to internists,
gynecologists,
and
urologists
whose
patients are screened appropriately for
colon, breast, and prostate cancer.
97. Examples include rewards for
keeping patients with chronic, treatable but
relapsing illnesses such as asthma and
schizophrenia out of the hospital.
98. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221.
99. M. Gregg Bloche & Peter D.
Jacobson, The Supreme Court and Bedside

I (2001)

Rationing, 284JAMA 2776 (2000).
100. See HALL, supra note 54.
101. A confounding problem in such
research is the fact that measures of health
status are highly correlated with indices of
socio-economic status, making it difficult to
draw conclusions about causality from
correlations between low-end coverage
(hard in itself to define operationally in
view of the many features of medical
coverage) and either health outcomes or
levels of intensity of care.
102. THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID, supra
note 61, at 18-24.
103. ROBINSON, supra note 93, at 35-62.
104. M. Gregg Bloche & Kevin Quinn,
Professionalism
and
Personhood,
in
PERSONHOOD IN HEALTH CARE (David
Thomasma ed., forthcoming).
105. Peter D. Jacobson & Michael T.
Cahill, Applying Fiduciary Responsibilities zn
the Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J.L. &
MED. 155 (2000).
106. The complex question of how to
fashion such limits is beyond my scope
here. It is one of the most important
challenges for health care law, and it has
received
insufficient attention
from
scholars and policymakers thus far.
107. Bloche & Jacobson, supra note 99,
at 2777.
108. Potential measures of stability
include mean frequency of changes in
patients' assignments to primary care
physicians, percentages of patients who
change primary caretakers at rates that
exceed "red flag" thresholds, and rates at
which hospitalized patients are attended by
their outpatient primary physicians.
109. Potential measures of accessibility

130
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 130 2001

RACE AND DISCRETION

include waiting times for routine and
urgent care appointments and frequencies
at which patients are seen by physicians
other than their primary care providers.
110. Somnath Saha et al., PatientPhysician Racial Concordance and the Perceived
Quality and Use of Health Care, 159 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 997 ( 1999).
Ill. Supra text accompanying notes 101103.

131
HeinOnline -- 1 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 131 2001

